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US District Court : CONTRACT | PATENT - 'retrofit' unambiguous in K; patent assignor estoppelUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTDISTRICT OF MINNESOTA SUPERIOR INDUSTRIES, LLC, Plaintiff, v. SWIFT MANUFACTURING CO., INC. Defendant. Case No. 05-CV-2167 (PJS/RLE) ORDER ON THE PARTIES’ CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT John M. Weyrauch, DICKE, BILLIG & CZAJA, PLLC, for plaintiff. Terrance C. Newby and Jonathan D. Jay, LEFFERT JAY & POLGLAZE, P.A., for defendant. This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff Superior Industries, LLC (“Superior”) moves for partial summary judgment on two issues: (1) how to interpret the contract — a patent license — at issue in this case; and (2) whether defendant Swift Manufacturing Co., Inc. (“Swift”) is forbidden, by the doctrine of assignor estoppel, to challenge the validity of the patent-in-suit. Swift moves for summary judgment on the grounds that, under Swift’s interpretation of the contract, Superior has granted Swift a license to conduct the activities that underlie Superior’s patent-infringement allegations. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Superior’s motion and denies Swift’s. I. BACKGROUND A. The Invention In the early 1990s, Richard Murphy, Swift’s founder, came up with an idea for an improved axle assembly (also called a “travel assembly”) for portable radial stacking conveyors. 1The descriptions in this section are generally based on information in the patent-in-suit, U.S. Patent No. 5,515,961. Although somewhat oversimplified, these descriptions should not be controversial. Stacking conveyors are essentially long ramps outfitted with conveyor belts.1 Material such as gravel, coal, or grain is loaded onto the bottom of the ramp, travels up the ramp by means of the conveyor belt, and drops off the top end of the ramp to form a pile or stack below (hence the name “stacking conveyor”). A “radial” stacking conveyor is a stacking conveyor that can be rotated, like the hand of a clock, around its bottom end so that multiple stacks can be deposited along an arc. Finally, a “portable” stacking conveyor is designed to be moved easily from one job site to another. Hence, a “portable radial stacking conveyor” is a long ramp fitted with a conveyor belt, with a central apparatus that supports the conveyor as it rotates, that can be moved easily from one job site to another. The axle assembly or “travel assembly” designed by Murphy serves as the central support upon which the radial stacking conveyor rests as it rotates. The travel assembly also serves as the axle supporting the conveyor when it is towed (hence the term “travel assembly”). Murphy’s design for an improved travel assembly for portable radial stacking conveyors incorporates two sets of wheels: one set to be used when towing the conveyor between job sites, and the second set to be used for rotating the conveyor when in use. Some time after coming up with the idea for his improved travel assembly, Murphy approached Neil Schmidgall, the founder of Superior, and asked for help in developing Murphy’s design into a commercial product. Weyrauch Decl. Ex. A (N. Schmidgall Dep.) at 9- 10 [Docket No. 22]. Neil Schmidgall agreed to work with Murphy, and Neil’s son Paul, a 2In August 1994, after the first two agreements were executed, Murphy also assigned to Superior all rights in his travel-assembly invention by way of an additional assignment agreement that was filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). Weyrauch Decl. Ex. D. That agreement essentially confirmed for the PTO the assignment that Murphy had already made in the Superior Agreement. Superior employee, was assigned to oversee development along with Murphy. Newby Aff. Ex. A (P. Schmidgall Dep.) at 30-31, 38-39 [Docket No. 29]. Out of the collaboration between Murphy and Superior came, in August 1994, a patent application for Murphy’s travel-assembly design. The application ultimately matured into U.S. Patent No. 5,515,961 (the ‘961 patent), entitled “Portable Radial Stacking Conveyor,” which was issued on May 14, 1996. The patent names Richard Murphy and Paul Schmidgall as the inventors, and Superior as the patent’s assignee. B. The Agreements In July 1994, shortly before the patent application was filed, Murphy, Swift, and Superior entered into a pair of agreements relating to Murphy’s invention. Murphy assigned his invention to Superior in a document titled “Agreement for Payment for Assignment,” which will be referred to as the “Superior Agreement.”2 Weyrauch Decl. Ex. C. In return for the assignment, Superior agreed that, for a period of ten years, it would pay Murphy royalties on each travel assembly Superior sold. Specifically, the Superior Agreement provides that Superior will pay to Murphy 0.00 for each unit it produces and sells during the ten years following the date of this agreement in connection with each new radial stacker incorporating the invention and 0.00 for each unit it produces and sells during the ten years following the date of this agreement for the purposes of retrofitting the invention onto existing radial stackers connection with each new radial stacker incorporating the invention [sic], provided, however, that nothing in this agreement shall oblige [Superior] to pay Murphy more than ,000.00 in any year, regardless of the number of units incorporating the invention which may be sold. Weyrauch Decl. Ex. C at 1-2. This provision includes an obvious drafting error: The phrase “connection with each new radial stacker incorporating the invention” (preceding the bracketed “sic”) was left in the agreement by mistake, and thus that language will be disregarded (as discussed in Section II(B) below). The same day that Murphy and Superior executed the Superior Agreement, Murphy’s company, defendant Swift, entered into a separate “Royalty Agreement” with Superior. Weyrauch Decl. Ex. E. Under this agreement — which will be referred to as the “Swift Agreement” — Superior promised to sell to Swift, at a discount, Superior-made travel assemblies incorporating Murphy’s design. For its part, Swift agreed that if it should ever manufacture its own travel assemblies using Murphy’s design, Swift would pay Superior royalties of 0 or 0 on each Swift-made travel assembly, depending on how the assembly was used. Specifically, the Swift Agreement provides: For use in large radial stackers of its own manufacture or retrofit assemblies, Swift Manufacturing Co. Inc. agrees to buy power fold down radial travel assemblies for [sic; read “from”] Superior Equipment Co. Price of said assemblies to be 10% less than distributor price. In the event that Swift chooses to build these units itself, Swift agrees to pay a royalty of 0.00 per unit for units used in a new Swift stacker and 0.00 royalty per unit for power fold down assemblies sold as retrofit units. Id. Neither the Swift Agreement nor the Superior Agreement expressly gives Swift a license to use Murphy’s invention, but that right is implicit in the Swift Agreement, and the right’s existence — though not its scope — is undisputed by the parties. The Swift Agreement will expire when the ‘961 patent expires. C. The Dispute For over ten years, Swift and Superior apparently had no significant disputes over the ‘961 patent or the Swift and Superior Agreements. That changed in 2005. Some time in 2004 or 2005, Swift sold three travel assemblies covered by the ‘961 patent to Masaba Mining Equipment (“Masaba”), an original equipment manufacturer (“OEM”) of stacking conveyors, and a competitor of Superior. Def. Ans. & Counterclaims at 5 (Counterclaims ¶ 7) [Docket No. 3]; Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. S.J. at 6 n.2 [Docket No. 31]. Masaba incorporated the travel assemblies into three Masaba-made portable radial stacking conveyors as they were being built. In early 2005, Superior learned that Swift had made at least some sales to Masaba. Newby Aff. Ex. J (Erholtz Dep.) at 13-15; Ex. K (Zeltwanger Dep. ) at 10-11. Superior contacted Swift to protest, asserting that Swift was not authorized to sell travel assemblies to OEMs such as Masaba. Newby Aff. Ex. G (Kleene Dep.) at 79. Superior proposed that it and Swift execute a new agreement that would clearly forbid sales by Swift to OEMs. Newby Aff. Ex. L. Swift refused to execute the proposed new agreement. Instead, Swift insisted that it already had the right, under the Swift Agreement, to sell travel assemblies to OEMs. Superior then brought this suit in September 2005, alleging that Swift had infringed (and contributed to infringement of) the ‘961 patent by selling patented assemblies outside the scope of the Swift Agreement. II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A dispute over a fact is “material” only if its resolution might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute over a fact is “genuine” only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 469 F.3d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir. 2006). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must assume that the nonmoving party’s evidence is true. Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 715 (8th Cir. 2003). B. Contract Interpretation This case turns on the meaning of one word: “retrofit.” Under the Swift Agreement, Swift may make and sell patented travel assemblies in only two circumstances. First, Swift may make and sell a travel assembly “in a new Swift stacker,” provided that Swift pays Superior a royalty of 0 per unit sold. The parties agree that Masaba-made stackers are not “Swift stacker[s],” and thus Swift’s sale of travel assemblies to Masaba is not authorized by this clause. Second, Swift may make and sell the travel assemblies “as retrofit units,” provided that Swift pays Superior a royalty of 0 per unit sold. The parties strongly dispute whether, when Swift sells travel assemblies to Masaba, Swift is selling those travel assemblies “as retrofit units.” Swift asserts, with a degree of confidence inversely proportional to the strength of its argument, that “there is no question that Swift’s interpretation [of ‘retrofit’] is correct [and that] . . . ‘assemblies sold as retrofit units’ is equivalent to ‘assemblies sold as new parts.’” Def. Mem. Opp. Mot. Partial S.J. (“Def. S.J. Opp.”) at 15 [Docket No. 36]. The Court disagrees. Under Minnesota law, interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a matter of law. City of Virginia v. Northland Office Props. Ltd. P’ship, 465 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). Whether a contract is ambiguous is also a question of law, id., and dictionaries can be useful in assessing whether a contract is ambiguous, see Costley v. Thibodeau, Johnson & Feriancek, PLLP, 259 F. Supp. 2d 817, 835-36 (D. Minn. 2003). When a contract is unambiguous, the court may not consider extrinsic evidence of the contract’s meaning or the parties’ intent. See Hous. & Redev. Auth. v. Norman, 696 N.W.2d 329, 337 (Minn. 2005) (“Under a contract analysis, we first look to the language of the contract and examine extrinsic evidence of intent only if the contract is ambiguous on its face.”). The Court agrees with Swift that the Swift Agreement is unambiguous — but, unfortunately for Swift, the Court holds that Swift’s proposed interpretation is unambiguously wrong. A travel assembly sold as a “retrofit unit” is a travel assembly sold to be incorporated into a fully manufactured radial stacking conveyor, whether used or new, after the normal manufacturing process has been completed, such that the radial stacking conveyor would be fully functional for, and could be sold “as is” to, an end user without the travel assembly. A travel assembly sold to an OEM for incorporation into a stacking conveyor during the manufacturing process is therefore not a “retrofit unit.” The word “retrofit” is not esoteric, so it is unsurprising that the parties did not define it in either the Superior Agreement (in which it takes the form of the present participle “retrofitting”) or the Swift Agreement (in which it takes the form of the adjective or attributive modifier “retrofit”). Cf. Weyrauch Decl. Ex. A (N. Schmidgall Dep.) at 56 (“I think we understood what retrofit meant.”). According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “retrofit” is an amalgam of the words “retroactive” and “refit.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, entry for “retrofit, n.,” http://dictionary.oed.com/ (2007) (“OED Online”). According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, the etymology is even simpler: The noun “retrofit” is a combination of the prefix “retro-” and the word “fit.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 1940 (1981) (“Webster’s Third”). In any case, the prefix “retro-” in “retrofit” — whether it is attached directly to “fit” (as per Webster’s Third) or indirectly incorporated into “retrofit” by way of “retroactive” (as per the OED Online) — retains its essential meaning of “backward” or “relating to the past.” See, e.g., American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1489 (4th ed. 2000) (“AHD Fourth”) (entry for prefix “retro-”); Webster’s Third 1940 (same). Major English-language dictionaries all define the word “retrofit” to reflect the idea, embodied in the prefix “retro-,” that a “retrofit” is a later (i.e., backward-looking) modification of an existing, completed product. So, for instance, the OED Online defines the noun “retrofit” as “[a] modification made to a product, esp[ecially] an aircraft, to incorporate changes made in later products of the same type or model.” OED Online, entry for “retrofit, n.” An example found in the OED Online, from a 1967 publication, makes this meaning clear: “It is some indication of Avimo’s position that it has been involved in three major retro-fits for aircraft — that is, the instruments already installed in the aircraft have been taken out and Avimo’s put in instead.” Id. (attested usage from the May 1967 Times Rev. Industry). The origins of the word “retrofit” in the aircraft industry are also reflected in Webster’s Third, which was published in 1981. Webster’s Third defines the noun “retrofit” to mean “a modification of equipment or an airplane to include changes made in later production models.” Webster’s Third 1940. The more-recently published AHD Fourth reflects the fact that “retrofit” has come into common usage outside of the aircraft industry. Because the definitions in AHD Fourth so plainly refute Swift’s argument that a “retrofit assembly” can be a “new part,” the Court quotes them at length. First, AHD Fourth provides two definitions for the transitive verb “retrofit”: 1. To provide (a jet, automobile, computer, or factory, for example) with parts, devices, or equipment not in existence or available at the time of original manufacture. 2. To install or fit (a device or system, for example) for use in or on an existing structure, especially an older dwelling. AHD Fourth 1489. As for the intransitive verb “retrofit,” AHD Fourth provides these two definitions (with an example in italics): 1. To fit into or onto equipment already in existence or service. 2. To substitute new or modernized parts or systems for older equipment: an industrial plant that was retrofitting to meet new safety regulations. Id. Another two definitions are provided for the noun “retrofit”: 1. Something that has been retrofitted or has undergone retrofitting. 2. An instance of modernizing or expanding with new or modified parts, devices, systems, or equipment: a retrofit for the heating system. Id. (example italicized in original). Finally, AHD Fourth provides a single definition for the adjective “retrofit”: “Relating to or being a retrofit: a retrofit kit for the homeowner; an energysaving retrofit program; a large retrofit market.” Id. (examples italicized in original). In arguing for its proposed interpretation of the word “retrofit” in the Swift Agreement, Superior cites a number of dictionary definitions of the verb “retrofit” that are consistent with the various definitions of “retrofit” cited above. Pl. Br. Supp. Mot. Partial S.J. at 11 [Docket No. 21] 3With respect to “retrofit” the noun and verb, “[i]t is a notable property of English that it has a great deal of homonymy between nouns and verbs.” Rodney Huddleston & Geoffrey K. Pullum, The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language Ch. 19, § 3.2 at 1641 (2002). And with respect to “retrofit” the noun and adjective, modern grammarians would, in fact, not classify the word “retrofit” in the phrase “retrofit units” as an adjective at all; instead, they would consider it to be the noun “retrofit” used as an “attributive modifier.” See id. Ch. 6 § 2.4.1(a) at 537, Ch. 19 § 3.3(b) at 1643 (“School grammars tend to say that in expressions like the Clinton policy the word Clinton is (or ‘is used as’) an adjective but . . . this is to confuse the wordcategory adjective with the function modifier of a noun. Any noun (other than a pronoun) can occur in this function, given a suitable head noun, so the appropriate way to handle such data is in terms of syntax (the distribution of nouns), not in terms of word-formation (the creation of new words).”). 4Moreover, although the Court does not rely on it, the testimony of both Neil Schmidgall and Richard Murphy about their understandings of the term “retrofit” in the Swift Agreement supports the Court’s interpretation of that term. See Weyrauch Decl. Ex. A (N. Schmidgall Dep.) at 34-35, 55-57; Ex. B. (Murphy Dep.) at 34-35, 38-39. (“Pl. S.J. Br.”). In response, Swift makes the strange argument that “a definition based on a transitive verb . . . simply sheds no light on what the word means when used as a noun or adjective.” Def. S.J. Opp. at 14-15. Swift is manifestly wrong; the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that English words rarely alter their meaning radically when used as different parts of speech.3 This fact is reflected in the above-cited definitions from AHD Fourth of “retrofit” the verb, “retrofit” the noun, and “retrofit” the adjective. When used as any of these three parts of speech, “retrofit” reflects the same core meaning of adding something to, or replacing something in, a completed, existing object. The plain meaning of “retrofit,” as reflected in the dictionary definitions cited above and in the word’s etymology, suffices by itself to refute Swift’s position. Further support for the Court’s interpretation of “retrofit” (though none is needed) comes from other aspects of the Swift and Superior Agreements.4 The Swift Agreement requires Swift to pay a 0 royalty for Swiftmade travel assemblies “used in a new Swift stacker,” but only a 0 royalty for Swift-made travel assemblies “sold as retrofit units.” Weyrauch Decl. Ex. E. Swift now argues, in effect, that “sold as retrofit units” means “sold for use in a new non-Swift stacker.” The parties could have written the agreement this way; they did not. Rather, they chose two contrasting phrases: “sold as retrofit units,” which is necessarily backward-looking (“retro”), and “used in a new Swift stacker,” which is necessarily forward-looking (“new”). In light of this contrast, “retrofit unit” cannot mean a travel assembly sold for use in the manufacture of a new radial stacking conveyor. The Superior Agreement also reflects this distinction between new units and retrofit units. The same day that Superior and Swift executed the Swift Agreement, Superior and Murphy (Swift’s owner at the time) executed the Superior Agreement. Two agreements so closely connected should be interpreted together. The Superior Agreement required Superior to pay to Murphy a 0 royalty for “each unit it produces and sells . . . in connection with each new radial stacker incorporating the invention,” and a 0 royalty for “each unit it produces and sells . . . for the purposes of retrofitting the invention onto existing radial stackers connection with each new radial stacker incorporating the invention [sic] . . . .” Weyrauch Decl. Ex. C at 1- 2. As noted in Section I above, the phrase “connection with each new radial stacker incorporating the invention” reflects an obvious drafting error. The drafter, in writing the 0- royalty provision, evidently copied the 0-royalty provision but failed to delete language that was no longer necessary in the 0-royalty provision. Thus, the entire phrase “connection with each new radial stacker incorporating the invention” should be stricken from the 0-royalty provision. With this revision, the Superior Agreement should be read as requiring: (1) a 0 royalty for each travel assembly sold “in connection with each new radial stacker” made by Superior, and (2) a 0 royalty for each travel assembly sold “for the purposes of retrofitting 5Section 102 of Title 35 provides: “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102. the invention onto existing radial stackers.” Id. (emphasis added). As the italicized language makes plain, the Superior Agreement makes explicit what is implicit in the Swift Agreement: to “retrofit” a travel assembly — that is, to use a “retrofit” assembly — is to incorporate the assembly into an “existing radial stacker,” not into one that is in the process of being manufactured. This is not to say that, under the Swift Agreement, “retrofit units” may only be incorporated into used radial stacking conveyors. On this point alone, the Court agrees with Swift. See Def. S.J. Opp. at 14 (“[N]one of Plaintiff’s dictionary definitions require the retrofitted item to be ‘used’ or ‘substantially used.’”). If, for example, a fully manufactured Masaba radial stacking conveyor had been sitting idly in a dealer showroom for several months, and the dealer bought a Swift travel assembly for incorporation into that stacker, that assembly would qualify as a “retrofit unit.” But travel assemblies sold to OEMs for incorporation into stacking conveyors during the manufacturing process are emphatically not “retrofit units” within the meaning of the Swift Agreement. C. Assignor Estoppel Swift, in defending this suit, has asserted that the ‘961 patent is invalid. Specifically, Swift argues that named inventor Paul Schmidgall was not, in fact, an inventor, and that the patent is therefore invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f).5 Def. Ans. & Counterclaims at 3 (Affirmative Defenses ¶ 2), 6 (Counterclaims ¶ 17); Def. S.J. Opp. at 18-20. Superior, however, contends that the doctrine of assignor estoppel forecloses Swift from challenging the validity of the ‘961 patent. Pl. S.J. Mem. at 12-13. The Court agrees with Superior. Assignor estoppel is a patent-law doctrine under which a party who assigns a patent is barred from later challenging that patent’s validity. Mentor Graphics Corp v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “This doctrine prevents the unfairness and injustice of permitting a party to sell something and later to assert that what was sold is worthless.” Id. (quotations omitted). Assignor estoppel applies both to the original assignor and to anyone in privity with the assignor. Id. at 1379. Swift wisely does not dispute that it is in privity with Murphy, who owned Swift when he assigned the ‘961 patent to Superior and when the parties executed the Swift and Superior Agreements. Swift attempts to avoid the application of assignor estoppel by arguing, first, that “the doctrine should be applied sparingly, depending on the facts of each case, just like any other equitable type of estoppel.” Def. S.J. Opp. at 18. But Swift gets the law exactly backwards. Although assignor estoppel is an equitable doctrine, the nature of the doctrine — it forbids a party “to sell something and later to assert that what was sold is worthless,” Mentor Graphics, 150 F.3d at 1378 (quotation omitted) — is such that the equities will usually favor its application. As the Federal Circuit has explained: Due to the intrinsic unfairness in allowing an assignor to challenge the validity of the patent it assigned, the implicit representation of validity contained in an assignment of a patent for value raises the presumption that an estoppel will apply. Without exceptional circumstances (such as an express reservation by the assignor of the right to challenge the validity of the patent or an express waiver by the assignee of the right to assert assignor estoppel), one who assigns a patent surrenders with that assignment the right to later challenge the validity of the assigned patent. Id. (emphasis added). There are no “exceptional circumstances” in this case to overcome the presumption in favor of assignor estoppel’s application. Swift also argues that assignor estoppel should not apply because Swift’s invalidity challenge is based on inventorship. Def. S.J. Opp. at 18. It is true that the Federal Circuit observed in Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc. that assignor estoppel “historically has applied to invalidity challenges based on novelty, utility, patentable invention, anticipatory matter, and the state of the art.” 848 F.2d 1220, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quotations omitted). Diamond Scientific did not, however, purport to limit the future application of assignor estoppel to only those bases on which the doctrine has historically been applied. And since Diamond Scientific, the Federal Circuit has upheld the application of assignor estoppel to prevent a defendant from challenging a patent’s validity based on inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f). Q.G. Prods., Inc. v. Shorty, Inc., 992 F.2d 1211, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The Court therefore agrees with Superior that assignor estoppel bars Swift from challenging the ‘961 patent’s validity. ORDER Based on the foregoing and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. Plaintiff Superior Industries, LLC’s motion for partial summary judgment [Docket No. 19] is GRANTED as follows: a. Under the terms of the Swift Agreement, a travel assembly sold as a “retrofit unit” is a travel assembly sold to be incorporated into a fully manufactured radial stacking conveyor, whether used or new, after the normal manufacturing process has been completed, such that the radial stacking conveyor would be fully functional for, and could be sold “as is” to, an end user without the travel assembly. A travel assembly sold to an OEM for incorporation into a stacking conveyor during the manufacturing process is not a “retrofit unit.” b. Defendant Swift Manufacturing Co., Inc.’s counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of invalidity and unenforceability, Def. Ans. & Counterclaims ¶¶ 15-19, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS. 2. Defendant Swift Manufacturing Co., Inc.’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement [Docket No. 27] is DENIED. Dated: September 24 , 2007 s/Patrick J. Schiltz Patrick J. Schiltz United States District Judge |
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